- Brother, Can You Spare a Billion? The United States, the IMF, and the International Lender of Last Resort. Oxford University Press. [buy on Amazon]
CLICK FOR abstract
When financial crises occur, it has long been accepted that national economies need a lender of last resort to stabilize markets. In today’s global financial system, crises are rarely confined to one country. Indeed, they often go global. Yet, there is no formal international lender of last resort (ILLR) to perform this function for the world economy. Conventional wisdom says that the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has emerged in recent decades as the de facto ILLR. Yet, that premise is incomplete. This book explores how the United States has for decades regularly complemented the Fund’s ILLR role by selectively providing billions of dollars in emergency loans to foreign economies in crisis. Why would U.S. policymakers ever put national financial resources at risk to “bailout” foreign governments and citizens to whom they are not beholden when the IMF was created for this purpose? I argue the United States has been compelled to provide such rescues unilaterally when it believes a multilateral response via the IMF is either too slow or too small to protect vital U.S. economic and financial interests. Through a combination of historical case studies and statistical analysis, I uncover the defensive motives behind U.S. decisions to provide global liquidity from the 1960s through the 2008 global financial crisis. The book paints a more complete picture of how international financial crises have been managed and highlights the unique role that the United States has played in stabilizing the world economy in troubled times.
- Systemic Strengths, Domestic Deficiencies: The Renminbi's Future as a Reserve Currency. (with David Steinberg) Journal of Contemporary China (2017)
CLICK FOR ABSTRACT
Will China’s currency, the renminbi (RMB), become as a major international reserve currency that rivals the US dollar in the next decade? This paper argues that this is unlikely for domestic political and economic reasons. China has some important systemic advantages that other recent challengers to the dollar have lacked, such as a large economy, major role in the international trading system, and substantial military capabilities. However, China’s domestic political system poses an important barrier to the internationalization of its currency. Chinese political institutions and financial policies reduce the attractiveness of the RMB as a reserve currency. Strong opposition to financial reform from Chinese interest groups has blocked financial reforms that would enhance the RMB’s attractiveness, and is likely to prevent substantial liberalizing reform in the future. Moreover, changes in China’s political economy during the Xi Jinping era (2012-present) have exacerbated these domestic deficiencies. Due to these various domestic political obstacles, the RMB is unlikely to emerge as a top reserve currency in the next ten years.
- Emergent International Liquidity Agreements: Central Bank Cooperation after the Global Financial Crisis. Journal of International Relations and Development (forthcoming)
CLICK FOR ABSTRACT
Central bank currency swap agreements have proliferated rapidly among emerging market economies (EMEs) since 2008. More than 80 such agreements have been signed in recent years. The accumulation of these agreements has resulted in the emergence of a new $1 trillion liquidity system by 2015. What explains the rapid proliferation of these agreements? What are the political and economic implications of the liquidity network for the international monetary and financial systems? I specify two key consequences of the global financial crisis and its aftermath that have led EME central banks to seek out swap agreements: volatile international capital flows and a recognition of the risks of dollar dependence in trade. I conclude that these liquidity agreements are unlikely to affect much change in the international monetary system. However, the system is transforming the international financial system through the creation of large liquidity lines for systemically important EMEs.
- Need for Speed: The Lending Responsiveness of the IMF. Review of International Organizations (2017) [replication data]
click for abstract
How responsive a lender is the International Monetary Fund (IMF)? In this paper, I introduce new data on IMF loan approval periods: The days that transpire between when a borrower submits a Letter of Intent to the Executive Board requesting a loan and when the Board approves that request. The data reveal considerable variation across requests. Why are some loan requests approved swiftly while others wait much longer for approval? I argue that the financial interests of the G-5 economies drive variation in responsiveness contingent on when a request was made. I expect that during much of the 1980s, as G-5 commercial bank exposure increases, borrowers will face longer waits for approval. In such cases, the G-5 should have been more likely to press for the use of the "concerted lending" strategy. This protected G-5 financial systems by catalyzing private financing on behalf of those countries, but it also delayed loan approval. Into the 1990s, global capital flows grew more complex and catalyzing private capital flows required a swift response. Thus, during these years I expect increased G-5 bank exposure to be associated with shorter waits for approval. In such cases, the G-5 should have been more likely to press for accelerated approval. A quick response would have the best chance of attracting back private capital and reduce the threat posed by the crisis. Statistical analyses of 275 loan requests from 1984-2012 support these expectations.
- No Reservations: International Order and Demand for the Renminbi as a Reserve Currency. (with Steven Liao) International Studies Quarterly (2016) [replication data]
click for abstract
This study identifies 37 central banks that added China’s Renminbi (RMB) to their reserve portfolio since 2010. Why do some states diversify into new reserve currencies at an early stage while most continue to take a wait-and-see approach? We argue that state preferences regarding international order influence decisions to invest in RMB. While some states support the liberal, U.S.-led status quo, others prefer an emerging Chinese alternative order. We contend that as state preferences for international order move away from the U.S.model (and toward China), the likelihood of diversifying reserves into RMB should increase. Thus, the decision to invest in RMB is not simply an economic choice. It is also a political act that signals and symbolizes a state’s preferences for a diminution of American global influence and support for a revised order. Employing new United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) ideal points data, we find that states with larger (smaller) ideal point distance with the U.S. (China) are more likely to adopt RMB as a reserve currency. Furthermore, such political considerations rather than economic concerns about transaction needs, optimal portfolio considerations, and instrumental calculations best explain emergent demand for the RMB as a reserve currency.
- Redback Rising: China’s Bilateral Swap Agreements and Renminbi Internationalization. (with Steven Liao) International Studies Quarterly (2015) [replication data]
click for abstract
For several years now China has implemented policies to promote the international use of its national currency, the Renminbi (RMB). As part of these efforts, the People’s Bank of China (PBC) has negotiated 24 bilateral currency swap agreements (BSAs) with foreign central banks that make it easier for firms in both China and its partner countries to settle cross-border trade and direct investment in RMB. We seek to explain why China and these countries are cooperating via BSAs. We theorize that trade and direct investment interdependence are linked to dyadic BSA cooperation via two mechanisms: financing insulation from international liquidity shocks and reduced transaction costs of cross-border exchange for local firms. Additionally, we expect the presence of preferential trade agreements (PTAs) and bilateral investment treaties (BITs) will increase the probability of dyadic BSA cooperation. BSAs are natural extensions of these existing agreements representing an additional layer of state-level formal cooperation further reducing barriers to cross-border trade and direct investment. Our empirical analysis finds that both de facto trade interdependence and de jure economic integration via PTAs and BITs increase the probability of BSA cooperation between China and partners. These findings are robust to alternative measures, model specifications, and methods
- The U.S. as Sovereign International Last-Resort Lender: The Fed’s Currency Swap Program during the Great Panic of 2007-2009. New Political Economy (2012)
Click for abstract
Beginning in late-2007 and culminating in autumn 2008, the US Federal Reserve took extraordinary action to address global dollar scarcity through the provision of dollar swap lines with a total of 14 foreign central banks. At their peak, these emergency credit lines provided nearly $600 billion in financing to economies starved of dollars. This case represents an archetypal example of ‘sovereign international last-resort lending’. he article explores this case in order to engage the following two questions. First, what criteria qualify a state to play the role of international lender of last resort (ILOLR)? Second, under what conditions will a state with the capacity to act choose to do so? The article argues that the primary factor from which states derive the capacity to act as ILOLR is the international status of their national currency. Additionally, it contends that states with the capacity to act as ILOLR do so for defensive reasons. Examining the Fed’s swap programme, three spillover effects are identified that threatened the US economy and motivated the US central bank to engage in defensive international last-resort lending during the crisis: financial system exposure, interest rate concerns, and a dramatic appreciation in the dollar’s exchange rate.
click for abstract
What explains the recent shift among emerging markets and developing countries (EMDs) toward capital account tightening? A large literature in International Political Economy examines why countries liberalize their capital account. Yet the global trend toward liberalization that characterized the 1990s and early-2000s has steadily reversed itself since 2006. We argue that EMD governments have re-embraced capital controls to insulate their economies from destabilizing capital flow volatility stemming from financial crises and monetary policy in advanced economies. To test our argument, we construct measures of volatility using data on quarterly changes in cross-border portfolio investment positions. Focusing on 51 EMDs from 2006 to 2015, we show that capital flow volatility increases overall capital account restrictions, though it is linked mainly to stricter outflow controls. The results suggest that increased capital flow volatility has not only resulted in an intellectual reassessment of the appropriateness of capital controls, it has also led to a policy shift toward closure among EMDs. More broadly, open international financial systems may produce negative feedback effects that place natural limits on liberalization.
click for abstract
This paper argues that credit rating agencies’ perceptions of democratic institutions are endogenous to familiarity and experience. Consequently, we expect that ratings agencies from stable democracies tend to view the presence of democratic institutions as reducing sovereign risk. On the other hand, rating agencies from non-democratic countries should tend to view the presence of democratic institutions more ambiguously or even negatively. To test this argument, we exploit the recent emergence of a globally active Chinese rating agency: Dagong Global Credit Rating. Specifically, we compare the institutional determinants of sovereign ratings of this Chinese agency with the three big U.S.-based agencies—Fitch, Moody’s, and S&P—over the 2010-2014 period. Our econometric analysis provides evidence that democratic sovereigns enjoy a ‘democratic advantage’ with the US agencies. However, being a democracy does not pay off when assessed by Chinese Dagong. This research holds broader implications on how the global power shifts towards emerging economies that have no or less experience with democracy are likely to affect the valuation of democratic institutions.
click for abstract
When one country’s economic policies have negative repercussions on their trading partners, foreign states will often pressure the home country to change course. Whether external pressure succeeds in changing the target state’s policies often depends on how domestic audiences react to outside pressure. This paper examines how external pressure influences public support for policy change. We consider three mechanisms through which external pressure might alter public opinion: by changing individuals’ interests, by activating their national identities, and by providing them with new information about a policy’s distributive effects. To test these rival explanations, we focus on the case of China-US currency relations. Using data from a survey experiment of Chinese internet users, we find strong support for the informational updating theory. Compared to individuals that received no information about the US position, those that were informed that the US had encouraged China to appreciate its exchange rate and those that were told that the US had threatened to punish China if it did not appreciate were more likely to believe that appreciation would be good for the US. Moreover, among those with a negative view of America, the “U.S. threat” and “U.S. endorsement” treatments reduced support for appreciation. The evidence therefore suggests that external pressure can reduce support for policy change because it leads individuals to believe that a policy serves the interests of rival states at the expense of their own country.
- The (Ineffective) Financial Statecraft of China's Bilateral Swap Agreements
CLICK FOR ABSTRACT
Since 2008, the People’s Bank of China (PBOC) has signed bilateral swap agreements (BSAs) with 35 foreign central banks. Collectively, these deals make nearly $500 billion in Chinese renminbi (RMB) available to Beijing’s foreign partners. What has led China to be so aggressive in its efforts to sign so many swap agreements? What are the political economic implications of the swap program for the US-centric global economic order? China’s BSAs can be understood as a form of financial statecraft: The use of national financial and monetary capabilities to achieve foreign policy ends. China has deployed BSAs for both defensive and offensive reasons. Defensively, Beijing has sought to use BSAs to promote trade settlement in RMB thereby reducing its vulnerability to the dollar’s structural dominance in trade. Yet, as I explain, they have been ineffective in this regard. Offensively, Beijing has used BSAs as a short-term liquidity backstop outside of the Bretton Woods institutions for partner countries in need. Here, there is greater potential for BSAs to impact the status quo economic order by enhancing Chinese economic influence. However, their potential is dependent on Beijing’s willingness to act as a unilateral crisis lender and its ability to further internationalize the RMB.
- Splitting the Winnings (and Losses): Relative versus Absolute Gains Considerations and Trade Attitudes (with Shana Kushner Gadarian)
click for abstract
Recent work on Americans’ trade attitudes has shown that voters’ views toward trade are tightly linked to their beliefs about whether trade is good for the United States economy as a whole. However, there are two ways to think about “winning” when it comes to trade. On one hand, a country can win maximizing absolute gains: getting as many material benefits for itself as possible regardless of how much its trading partners benefit. On the other hand, a country can win by maximizing relative gains: making sure that it obtains a larger benefit than its trading partners. We use a survey experiment to test whether two characteristics of the trading country (its security relationship to the US and its cultural similarity to the US) shape whether American citizens prefer trade relationships that confer absolute or relative benefits. Our results indicate that US cultural distance from a trade partner does not impact relative gains thinking. However, when considering trade relations with adversaries, we find that Americans are more likely to prefer outcomes where US relative gains are maximized, even if this brings about a suboptimal outcome in absolute terms. In addition, we find that these results are strongly conditioned on partisanship and collective narcissism.